Anselm's 'On the Fall of the Devil' and the Will for Happiness

                 In 'De Casu Diaboli,' or 'On the Fall of the Devil, one of his two theological dialogues on free will, Anselm argues that for an angel (and by extension other rational creatures) to possess free will, the angel must have two wills or dispositions such that the angel can will in accordance with one disposition or will in accordance with the other disposition. In one interesting thought experiment, Anselm, in the guise of his character the Teacher, poses the following question to his interlocutor, the Student.

                 Imagine, the Teacher proposes, that God creates an angel and gives him only the will for happiness. Is it possible, he continues, that the angel wills anything besides happiness? Anselm's answer is no, and his response is as follows, as represented by the opinion of the Teacher.

S. I do not know how to answer. If in fact he cannot, I do not see how one who cannot will what he believes leads to happiness can be said to will happiness. If he can, I do not see why he cannot will something else.

T. But what does he who wills something, not for its own sake but for something else really will? That which he is said to will or that by means of which he wills it?

S. Certainly that which he wills by means of the other.

T. So one who wills something for the sake of his happiness really wills nothing other than his happiness. Hence he can will that which leads to happiness while willing only his happiness.

S. That is clear enough.

Anselm's point seems to be that if one wills both x and y and one also wills x for the sake of willing y, then it still follows that the person wills y. It is not clear at this point that Anselm fairly represents the Student's objection; for, in willing x for the sake of willing y, it also (still) follows that the person wills x. So, it appears false that the person really wills nothing but happiness. Something else one might point out is that it is not clear that Anselm is entitled to 

T1: Hence he can will that which leads to happiness while willing only his happiness.

rather than only

T2: Hence he can will that which he believes leads to happiness while willing only his happiness. 

It is true that in the case of (T2) he would still be willing something he believed would make him 

happy because he willed to be happy, but one could argue that there is a significant difference 

between willing what is (generally) good and willing what is (particularly) good such that the 

particular good I will is only apparently good insofar as it is not conducive (all things considered) to 

my happiness. One might express this by saying that there is an illicit jump in Anselm's move from 

the claim that one only has a disposition for willing the good to the claim that one has a disposition 

for only willing the good.