Immanent Realism is the view that there are such entities as
Universal properties and that these Universal properties are multiply
instantiated in various (qualitatively identical) concrete instances or tokens
of a specific Universal. It's natural contrast (perhaps) is the view that,
while there are Universals, they are not tied to concrete entities or instances
for their existence but exist as abstract objects in a mode of existence
distinct from the way in which concrete objects exist -- a view also known as
Platonism.
One objection
to Immanent Realism is as follows. We have an everyday conception of a property
or an attribute as an entity that a thing can gain or lose with the passage of
time. But Immanent Realism makes the existence of a property dependent on its
having concrete instances. And this does not seem right. For example, take the
following illustration:
One might imagine that a primitive craftsman, Tab, is making
the world's first table. Tab says, "I want to make a thing that will have
a reasonably flat surface, parallel to and about three feet from the floor of
the cave. But I want most of the volume underneath the surface to be open, so
we can pull chairs up close and sit down without smashing our knees against
something ... So I'm going to hew a fairly thin slab out of this huge dead tree
trunk, and I'm going to put three or four narrow struts or "legs" of
equal length near the edges, spaced equally apart, and perpendicular to the
place of the slab.[1]
Call the concept of the thing that Tab has described the
concept of a table. Once Tab succeeds and brings the first table into
existence, so, too, it seems, does the property 'being a table' come into
existence. Now, so the objection goes, it seems that there are a few things to
note about the state(s) of affairs in which both the table and the property
'being a table' come into existence.
According
to Immanent Realism, the property of 'being a table' did not exist when Tab
first announced that he was planning to make the first table. Now, imagine that
there is a second craftsman, Fab, who decides to imitate Tab and also create a
table. To those who ask what he's doing, Fab responds, "I'm making a
table," and follows this with a description like the one I cited above.
Now, also according to Immanent Realism, the property of 'being a table' did
exist when Fab made his utterance about making a table. But Fab was able to
give a description of a table in the same way that Tab did to people who did
not understand it. The question now is this: does the "word" table,
as it occurs in Fab's utterance, express the property of 'being a table' or
not? If it does not, then it seems odd that Tab and Fab could explain their
utterances in precisely the same way that they did. If it does, then it's hard
to see what the Immanent Realist needs properties for in the first place. For
Tab didn't need the property 'being a table' to make a table. Nor did he need
it in order to make sense of sentences containing the word "table."
My response
to this objection is that it confuses the concept
of a table with the property 'being a table.' The property of 'being a table'
is a property that something has, I say, if and only if the thing in question
actually exists and it also adequately matches the concept 'table.' To show
that the two are different, first note that there is obviously either some
entity that is the concept of a table
or the Nominalist equivalent of the concept of a table that itself is not an
entity. (Since for the moment I'm simply assuming that Realism is true, I will
politely nudge aside the Nominalist alternatives.) Now, if the concept of a
table is itself something with the property 'being a table,' then the concept
of a table is itself a table. But clearly it is not -- a concept, in the sense
of a Universal entity or a Nominalistic equivalent, is not possibly something
that is a table. Nor is anything that is a subjective
mental concept a table: very clearly, my
concept of a table is not itself a table.
But perhaps the objector has nothing too serious riding on the expression of the property 'being a table' as "being a table." Perhaps the relevant property in question could be better expressed -- or at least just as effectively -- through the signification "having tableness," this property being that in virtue of which a table is a table. If understood in this sense, the objector can once more press the worry from earlier: a thing is a table only if it has the property 'having tableness.' But something has tableness only if it actually exists. So, if there are no actually existing tables, there is no property of 'having tableness.' And therefore if there are no tables that exist, there is no property of 'having tableness.' However, the argument so far is incomplete in the sense of being invalid. In order to be valid, it would require an extension of the premise <but something has 'having tableness' only if it exists> to <but something has 'having tableness' only if it both exists and is a table>.
However, taken in this way, the premise is not obviously true. If not further clarified, it would imply that the universal property of which all tables are concrete instances is itself a table, which seems obviously wrong. Rather, one would want to say that the universal itself just is the property 'having tableness.' But, then, I think, one can simply point out that the argument fails for an unrelated but more serious reason. For if one argues that a thing is a table only if it has the property 'having tableness,' one cannot also consistently argue that something has the property 'having tableness' only if the thing actually exists and is a table. For, then, the argument is patently circular. And if all this I have said is right, I conclude that it's false that one requires the property 'being a table' either to make meaningful statements about tables or to produce tables.
But perhaps the objector has nothing too serious riding on the expression of the property 'being a table' as "being a table." Perhaps the relevant property in question could be better expressed -- or at least just as effectively -- through the signification "having tableness," this property being that in virtue of which a table is a table. If understood in this sense, the objector can once more press the worry from earlier: a thing is a table only if it has the property 'having tableness.' But something has tableness only if it actually exists. So, if there are no actually existing tables, there is no property of 'having tableness.' And therefore if there are no tables that exist, there is no property of 'having tableness.' However, the argument so far is incomplete in the sense of being invalid. In order to be valid, it would require an extension of the premise <but something has 'having tableness' only if it exists> to <but something has 'having tableness' only if it both exists and is a table>.
However, taken in this way, the premise is not obviously true. If not further clarified, it would imply that the universal property of which all tables are concrete instances is itself a table, which seems obviously wrong. Rather, one would want to say that the universal itself just is the property 'having tableness.' But, then, I think, one can simply point out that the argument fails for an unrelated but more serious reason. For if one argues that a thing is a table only if it has the property 'having tableness,' one cannot also consistently argue that something has the property 'having tableness' only if the thing actually exists and is a table. For, then, the argument is patently circular. And if all this I have said is right, I conclude that it's false that one requires the property 'being a table' either to make meaningful statements about tables or to produce tables.
This
still leaves important questions as to (i) how one can form subjective personal
concepts of a table that correspond in varying degrees to the concept of a table and (ii) what sort of ontological status the concept of a table is said to have, but I will mostly leave these questions for
another time. I will say, however, that I think it's unproblematic to ground
the concepts of possibly existing objects in actually existing ones. For
example, nothing that went into Tab's forming a (personal) concept of a table
required Tab's forming a (personal) concept of things or ideas that aren't
derived from the actual world.
In this case, one might further pursue the following strategies: (1) argue that the concept of table exists in virtue of the existence of the varying constituents of that concept or (2) argue that the concept of table is an artificial concept. That is, it is something that humans in some sense create based on either (a) things that actually exist or (b) the various powers that some actually existing things have for bringing about effects that are not active features of those things) (e.g., a piece of flint has the power for bringing about fire, even though it is not actually on fire) or (c) a combination of (a) and (b).
In this case, one might further pursue the following strategies: (1) argue that the concept of table exists in virtue of the existence of the varying constituents of that concept or (2) argue that the concept of table is an artificial concept. That is, it is something that humans in some sense create based on either (a) things that actually exist or (b) the various powers that some actually existing things have for bringing about effects that are not active features of those things) (e.g., a piece of flint has the power for bringing about fire, even though it is not actually on fire) or (c) a combination of (a) and (b).
[1] Michael Jubien, Contemporary Metaphysics: An Introduction. (Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing, 1997), 49.
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